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Abstract
Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between
a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an
infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the
graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the bidding
mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration
games. Both players have separate budgets, which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place. Both
players submit bids simultaneously, and a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget. The winner
of the bidding pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. For reachability objectives, repeated
bidding games have been studied and are called Richman games [36, 35]. There, a central question is the
existence and computation of threshold budgets; namely, a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget
exceeds t, he can win the game, and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1− t, he can win the game. We focus on
parity games and mean-payoff games. We show the existence of threshold budgets in these games, and
reduce the problem of finding them to Richman games. We also determine the strategy-complexity of an
optimal strategy. Our most interesting result shows that memoryless strategies suffice for mean-payoff
bidding games.
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1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are an important class of games as they model the
interaction of a system and its environment. Questions about automatic synthesis of a reactive system
from its specification [40] are reduced to finding a winning strategy for the “system” player in a two-
player game. The game is played by placing a token on a vertex in the graph and allowing the
players to move it throughout the graph, thus producing an infinite trace. The winner or value of the
game is determined according to the trace. There are several common modes to determine how the
players move the token that are used to model different types of systems (c.f., [4]). The most well-
studied mode is turn-based, where the vertices are partitioned between the players and the player
who controls the vertex on which the token is placed, moves it. Other modes include probabilistic
and concurrent moves.
We study a different mode of moving, which we refer to as bidding, and to the best of our
knowledge, has never been studied for infinite-duration games. Both players have budgets, where
for convenience, we have B1 + B2 = 1. In each turn a bidding takes place for the right to move
the token. The players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the
available budget. Thus, a bid is a real number in [0, Bi], for i ∈ {1, 2}. The player who bids higher
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pays the other player, and decides where the token moves. Draws can occur and one needs to devise
a mechanism for resolving them (e.g., giving advantage to Player 1), and our results do not depend
on a specific mechanism.
Bidding arises in many settings and we list several examples below. The players in a two-
player game often model concurrent processes. Bidding for moving can model an interaction with
a scheduler. The process that wins the bidding gets scheduled and proceeds with its computation.
Thus, moving has a cost and processes are interested in moving only when it is critical. When and
how much to bid can be seen as quantifying the resources that are needed for a system to achieve
its objective, which is an interesting question. Other takes on this problem include reasoning about
which input signals need to be read by the system at its different states [20, 2] as well as allowing
the system to read chunks of input signals before producing an output signal [28, 27, 33]. Also, our
bidding game can model scrip systems that use internal currencies for bidding in order to prevent
“free riding” [31]. Such systems are successfully used in various settings such as databases [43],
group decision making [42], resource allocation, and peer-to-peer networks (see [29] and references
therein). Finally, repeated bidding is a form of a sequential auction [37], which is used in many
settings including online advertising.
Recall that the winner or value of the game is determined according to the outcome, which
is an infinite trace. There are several well-studied objectives in games. The simplest objective is
reachability, where Player 1 has a target vertex and a trace is winning for him iff it visits the target.
Bidding reachability games are equivalent to Richman games [36, 35], named after David Richman.
Richman games are the first to study the bidding mode of moving. The central question that is
studied on Richman games regards a threshold budget, which is a function THRESH : V → [0, 1]
such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds THRESH(v) at a vertex v, then he has a strategy to win the
game. On the other hand, if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1− THRESH(v), he can win the game (recall
that the budgets add up to 1). In [36, 35], the authors show that threshold budgets exist, are unique,
and that finding them is in NP. We slightly improve their result by showing that the problem is in NP
and coNP. We illustrate the bidding model and the threshold problem in the following example.
I Example 1. Consider for example, the bidding reachability game that is depicted in Figure 1.
Player 1’s goal is to reach t, and Player 2’s goal is to prevent this from happening. How much budget
suffices for Player 1 to guarantee winning? Clearly, even if Player 1 has all the budget, he cannot
win in v1, thus THRESH(v1) = 1. Similarly, even if Player 2 has all the budget in t, Player 1 has
already won, thus THRESH(t) = 0. We show a naive solution in which Player 1 wins when his
budget exceeds 0.75. Indeed, if Player 1’s budget is 0.75 + , for  > 0, then since the budgets add
up to 1, Player 2’s budget is 0.25− . In the first turn, Player 1 bids 0.25 + 2 and wins the bidding
since Player 2 cannot bid above 0.25. He pays his bid to Player 2 and moves the token to v2. Thus,
at the end of the round, the budgets are 0.5 + 2 and 0.5 − 2 and the token is on v2. In the second
bidding, Player 1 bids all his budget, wins the bidding since Player 2 cannot bid above 0.5, moves
the token to t, and wins the game. It turns out that the threshold budgets are lower: it follows from
Theorem 3 that they are THRESH(v0) = 2/3 and THRESH(v2) = 1/3. J
We introduce and study infinite duration bidding games with richer qualitative objectives as well
as quantitative objectives. Parity games are an important class of qualitative games as the problem
of reactive synthesis from LTL specifications is reduced to a parity game. The vertices in a parity
game are labeled by an index in {0, . . . , d}, for some d ∈ N, and an infinite trace is winning for
Player 1 iff the parity of the maximal index that is visited infinitely often is odd. The quantitative
games we focus on are mean-payoff games. An infinite outcome has a value, which can be thought
of as the amount of money that Player 1 pays Player 2. Accordingly, we refer to the players in a
mean-payoff game as Maximizer (Max, for short) and Minimizer (Min, for short). The vertices of a
mean-payoff game are labeled by values in Z. Consider an infinite trace pi. The energy of a prefix
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pin of length n of pi, denoted E(pin), is the sum of the values it traverses. The mean-payoff value
of pi is lim infn→∞E(pin)/n. We are interested in cases where Min can guarantee a non-positive
mean-payoff value. It suffices to show that he can guarantee that an infinite outcome pi either has
infinitely many prefixes with E(pin) = 0, or that the energy is bounded, thus there is N ∈ N such
that for every n ∈ N, we haveE(pin) ≤ N . We stress the point that there are two “currencies” in the
game: a “monopoly money” that is used to determine who moves the token and which the players
do not care about once the game ends, and the values on the vertices, which is the value that Min
and Max seek to minimize and maximize, respectively. We illustrate mean-payoff games with the
following example.
v0 v2 tv1 1 −1
Figure 1 On the left, a bidding reachability game. On the right, a bidding mean-payoff game where the
weights are depicted on the edges.
I Example 2. Consider the mean-payoff bidding game that is depicted in Figure 1, where for
convenience the values are placed on the edges and not on the vertices. We claim that Min has a
strategy that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Without loss of generality, Max always
chooses the 1-valued edge. Min’s strategy is a tit-for-tat-like strategy, and he always takes the (−1)-
valued edge. The difficulty is in finidng the right bids. Initially, Min bids 0. Assume Max wins a
bidding with b > 0. Min will try and match this win: he bids b until he wins with it. Let b1, . . . , bn
be Max’s winning bids before Min wins with b. We call these un-matched bids. The next bid Min
attempts to match is b′ = min1≤i≤n bi; he bids b′ until he wins with it, and continues similarly until
all bids are matched.
We claim that the tit-for-tat strategy guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Observe first
that if a prefix of the outcome has k unmatched bids, then the energy is k. In particular, if all bids
are matched, the energy is 0. Suppose Min bids b. We claim that the number of un-matched bids is
at most d1/be. Otherwise, since b is less than all other un-matched bids, Max would need to invest
more than a budget of 1. It follows that an infinite outcome that never reaches energy level 0 has
bounded energy, thus the mean-payoff value is non-positive. J
We study the existence and computation of threshold budgets in parity and mean-payoff bidding
games. Also, we determine the strategy complexity that is necessary for winning. Recall that a
winning strategy in a game typically corresponds to an implementation of a system. A strategy that
uses an unbounded memory, like the tit-for-tat strategy above, is not useful for implementing. Thus,
our goal is to find strategies that use little or no memory, which are known as memoryless strategies.
We show that parity bidding games are linearly-reducible to Richman games allowing us to ob-
tain all the positive results from these games; threshold budgets exist, are unique, and computing
them is no harder than for Richman games, i.e., the problem is in NP and coNP. We find this res-
ult quite surprising since for most other modes of moving, parity games are considerably harder
than reachability games. The crux of the proof considers bottom strongly-connected components
(BSCCs, for short) in the arena, i.e., SCCs with no exiting edges. We show that in a strongly
connected bidding parity game, exactly one of the players wins with every initial budget, thus the
threshold budgets of the vertices of a BSCC are in {0, 1}. If the vertex with highest parity in a BSCC
is odd, then Player 1 wins, i.e., the threshold budgets are all 0, and otherwise Player 2 wins, i.e., the
threshold budgets are all 1. We can thus construct a Richman game by setting the target of Player 1
to the BSCCs that are winning for him and the target of Player 2 to the ones that are winning for
him. Moreover, we show that memoryless strategies are sufficient for winning in these games.
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We proceed to study mean-payoff bidding games. We adapt the definition of threshold values;
we say that t ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold value for Min if with a budget that exceeds t, Min can guarantee a
non-positive mean-payoff value. On the other hand, if Max’s budget exceeds 1− t, he can guarantee
a positive mean-payoff value. We show that threshold values exist and are unique in mean-payoff
bidding games. The crux of the existence proof again considers the BSCCs of the game. We show
that in a strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding game, the threshold budgets are in {0, 1}, thus
again either Min “wins” or Max “wins” the game. Moreover, this classification can be determined in
NP and coNP, thus the complexity of solving bidding mean-payoff games coincides with Richman
games. Our results for strongly-connected games are obtained by developing the connection that was
observed in [36, 35] between the threshold budget and the reachability probability in a probabilistic
model on the same structure as the game. We show a connection between bidding mean-payoff
games and one-counter 2.5-player games [14, 13] to prove the classification of BSCCs. In turn, these
games are equivalent to discrete quasi-birth-death processes [24] and generalize solvency games
[11], which can be thought of as a rewarded Markov decision process with a single vertex.
The classification above is existential in nature and does not provide any insight on how a player
guarantees a mean-payoff value. Our most technically challenging results concern the constructions
strategies for Min and Max. The challenging part of the construction is reasoning about strongly-
connected bidding mean-payoff games. Consider a strongly-connected game in which Min can
guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff value. The idea of our construction is to tie between changes
in Min’s budget with changes in the energy; investing one unit of budget (with the appropriate
normalization) implies a decrease of a unit of energy, and on the other hand, an increase of a unit of
energy implies a gain of one unit of budget. Since the budgets are bounded by 1, the value cannot
increase arbitrarily. Finding the right bids in a general SCC is not trivial, and we find our solution
to be surprisingly elegant. The case where Max can guarantee a positive mean-payoff value, is more
challenging. Unlike a memoryless strategy for Min, the normalization factor must decrease as the
value increases so that Max does not exhaust his budget. We show constant memory strategies in
general and identify a fragment in which we show memoryless strategies.
Further bidding games Variants of bidding games where studied in the past. Already in [35]
several variants are studied including a poorman version in which the winner of the bidding pays
the bank, thus the amount of money in the game decreases as the game proceeds. Motivated by
recreational games, e.g., bidding chess, discrete bidding games are studied in [23], where the money
is divided into chips, so a bid cannot be arbitrarily small as in the bidding games we study. In all-pay
bidding games [38], the players all pay their bids to the bank. Non-zero-sum two-player games were
recently studied in [30]. They consider a bidding game on a directed acyclic graph. Moving the
token throughout the graph is done by means of bidding. The game ends once the token reaches a
sink, and each sink is labeled with a pair of payoffs for the two players that do not necessarily sum up
to 0. They show existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for every initial budget and a polynomial
algorithm to compute it.
Due to lack of space, most of the proofs appear in the full version [5].
2 Preliminaries
An arena is a pair 〈G,α〉, where G is a directed graph and α is an objective. A game is played on
an arena as follows. A token is placed on a vertex in the arena and the players move it throughout
the graph. The outcome is an infinite path pi. The winner or value is determined according to pi and
α as we elaborate below. There are several common modes in which the players move the token.
In turn-based games the vertices are partitioned between the players and the player who controls
the vertex on which the token is placed, moves it. Another mode is probabilistic choices, where the
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game can be thought of as a Markov chain, thus the edges are labeled with probabilities, and the edge
on which the token proceeds is chosen randomly. A combination of these two modes is called 2.5-
player games, where the vertices are partitioned into three sets: Player 1 vertices, Player 2 vertices,
and probabilistic vertices. Finally, in concurrent games, each player has a possible (typically finite)
set of actions he can choose from in a vertex. The players select an action simultaneously, and the
choice of actions dictates to which vertex the token moves.
We study a different mode of moving, which we call bidding. Both players have budgets, where
for convenience, we have B1+B2 = 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place to determine who moves
the token. Both players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is a real number in [0, Bi], for
i ∈ {1, 2}. The player who bids higher pays the other player and decides where the token moves.
Note that the sum of budgets always remains 1. While draws can occur, in the questions we study
we try avoid the issue of draws.
A strategy prescribes to a player which action to take in a game, given a finite history of the game,
where we define these two notions below. In 2.5-player games, histories are paths and actions are
vertices. Thus, a strategy for Player i, for i ∈ {1, 2}, takes a finite path that ends in a Player i vertex,
and prescribes to which vertex the token moves to next. In bidding games, histories and strategies are
more complicated as they maintain the information about the bids and winners of the bids. A history
is a sequence of the form v0, 〈v1, b1, i1〉, 〈v2, b2, i2〉, . . . , 〈vk, bk, ik〉 ∈ V · (V × [0, 1] × {1, 2})∗,
where, for j ≥ 1, in the j-th round, the token is placed on vertex vj−1, the winning bid is bj , and
the winner is Player ij , and Player ij moves the token to vertex vj . An action for a player is 〈b, v〉 ∈
([0, 1]× V ), where b is the bid and v is the vertex to move to upon winning. An initial vertex v0 and
strategies f1 and f2 for Players 1 and 2, respectively, determine a unique outcome pi for the game,
denoted out(v0, f1, f2), which is an infinite sequence in V · (V × [0, 1]× {1, 2})ω . We sometimes
abuse notation and refer to out(v0, f1, f2) as a finite prefix of the infinite outcome. We drop v0 when
it is clear from the context. We define the outcome inductively. The first element of the outcome
is v0. Suppose pi1, . . . , pij is defined. The players bids are given by 〈b1, v1〉 = f1(pi1, . . . , pij) and
〈b2, v2〉 = f2(pi1, . . . , pij). If b1 > b2, then pij+1 = 〈v1, b1, 1〉, and dually when b1 < b2, we
have pij+1 = 〈v2, b2, 2〉. We assume there is some tie-breaking mechanism that determines who the
winner is when b1 = b2, and our results are not affected by what the tie-breaking mechanism is.
Consider a finite outcome pi. The payment of Player 1 in pi, denoted B1(pi), is
∑
1≤j≤|pi|(−1)3−ij bj ,
and Player 2’s payment, denoted B2(pi) is defined similarly. For i ∈ {1, 2}, consider an initial
budget Biniti ∈ [0, 1] for Player i. A strategy f is legal for Player i with respect to Biniti if for every
v0 ∈ V and strategy g for the other player, Player i’s bid in a finite outcome pi = out(v0, f, g) does
not surpass his budget. Thus, for 〈b, v〉 = f(pi), we have b ≤ Biniti − Bi(pi).
Richman games and threshold budgets The simplest qualitative objective is reachability: Player 1
has a target vertex vR and an infinite outcome is winning for him if it visits vR. Reachability bidding
games are known as Richman games [36, 35]. In Richman games both players have a target, which
we denote by vR and vS . The game ends once one of the targets is reached. Note that this definition
is slightly different from standard reachability games since there, Player 2 has no target and his goal
is to keep the game from vR. Though, we show that for our purposes, since Richman games have no
ties, reachability games are equivalent to Richman games (see Lemma 4).
The central question that is studied on bidding games regards a threshold budget. A threshold
budget is a function THRESH : V → [0, 1] such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds THRESH(v) at a
vertex v, then he has a strategy to win the game. On the other hand, if Player 2’s budget exceeds
1− THRESH(v), he can win the game. We sometimes use THRESH1(v) to refer to THRESH(v) and
THRESH2(v) to refer to 1− THRESH(v). We formalize the problem of finding threshold budgets as
a decision problem. We define the THRESH-BUDG problem, which takes as input a bidding game
CONCUR 2017
17:6 Infinite-Duration Bidding Games
G, a vertex v, and a value t ∈ [0, 1], and the goal is to decide whether THRESH(v) = t.
Threshold values are shown to exist in [36] as well as how to compute them. We review briefly
their results. Consider a Richman game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉. We define the Richman function as
follows. We first define R(v, i), for i ∈ N ∪ {0}, where the intuition is that if Player 1’s budget
exceeds R(v, i), he can win in at most i steps. We define R(vR, 0) = 0 and R(v, 0) = 1 for
every other vertex v ∈ V . Indeed, Player 1 can win in 0 steps from vR no matter what his initial
budget is, and even if he has all the budget, he cannot win in 0 steps from anywhere else. Consider
i ∈ N and v ∈ V . We denote by adj(v) ⊆ V , the adjacent vertices to v, so u ∈ adj(v) iff
E(v, u). Let v+ be the vertex that maximizes the expression maxu∈adj(v)R(u, i − 1), and let
v− be the vertex that minimizes the expression minu∈adj(v)R(u, i − 1). We define R(v, i) =
1
2
(
R(v+, i− 1)+R(v−, i− 1)). We define R(v) = limi→∞R(v, i). The following theorem shows
that R(v) equals THRESH(v), and throughout the paper we use them interchangeably. We give the
proof of the theorem for completeness.
I Theorem 3. [36] For every v ∈ V , we have THRESH(v) = R(v), thus if Player 1’s budget at v
exceeds R(v), he can win from v, and if Player 2’s budget exceeds 1−R(v), he can win from v.
Proof. We prove for Player 1 and the proof for Player 2 is dual. Let t ∈ N be an index such
that Binit1 > R(v, t). We prove by induction on t that Player 1 wins in at most t steps. The
base case is easy. For the inductive step, assume Player 1 has a budget of R(v, i) + . He bids
b1 = 12
(
R(v+, i − 1) − R(v−, i − 1)). If he wins the bidding, he proceeds to v− with a budget of
R(v−, i− 1) + . If he loses, then Player 2’s bid exceeds b1 and the worst he can do is move to v+.
But then Player 1’s budget is at least R(v+, i − 1) + . By the induction hypothesis, Player 1 wins
in at most i− 1 steps from both positions. J
We make precise the equivalence between reachability and Richman games.
I Lemma 4. Consider a bidding reachability game G = 〈V,E, T 〉, where T ⊆ V is a target set
of vertices for Player 1. Let S ⊆ V be the vertices with no path to T . Consider the Richman game
G′ = 〈V ∪{vR, vS}, E′, vR, vS〉, where E′ = E∪{〈v, vR〉 : v ∈ T}∪{〈v, vS〉 : v ∈ S}. For every
v ∈ V , the threshold budget of v in G equals the threshold budget of v in G′.
Finding threshold budgets The authors in [35] study the complexity of threshold-budget problem
and show that is in NP. They guess, for each vertex v its neighbors v− and v+, and devise a linear
program with the constraints R(v) = 12
(
R(v−) + R(v+)
)
and, for every neighbor v′ of v, we have
R(v−) ≤ R(v′) ≤ R(v+). The program has a solution iff the guess is correct. They leave open the
problem of determining the exact complexity of finding the threshold budgets, and they explicitly
state that it is not known whether the problem is in P or NP-hard.
We improve on their result by showing that THRESH-BUDG is in NP and coNP. Our reduction
uses an important observation that is made in [36], which will be useful later on. They connect
between threshold budgets and reachability probabilities in Markov chains.
I Observation 5. Consider a Richman game G = 〈V,E, vR, vS〉. Let M(G) be a Markov chain
in which for each vertex v ∈ V , the probability of the edges 〈v, v+〉 and 〈v, v−〉 is 12 and the other
outgoing edges from v have probability 0. Then, since R(v) = 12
(
R(v+) + R(v−)
)
, in M(G), the
probability of reaching vR from v is THRESH(v).
We reduce THRESH-BUDG to the problem of “solving” a simple stochastic game (SSG, for
short) [22]. An SSG has two players; one tries to minimize the probability that the target is reached,
and the second player tries to minimize it. It is well-known that the game has a value, which is
the probability of reaching the target when both players play optimally. The problem of finding the
value of an SSG is known to be in NP ∩ coNP. The SSG we construct can be seen as a turn-based
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game in which the player whose turn it is to move is chosen uniformly at random. The details of the
proof can be found in the full version.
I Theorem 6. THRESH-BUDG for Richman games is in NP ∩ coNP.
We stress the fact that the strategies in SSGs are very different from bidding games. As mentioned
above, there, the strategies only prescribe which vertex to move the token to, whereas in bidding
games, a strategy also prescribes what the next bid should be. So, a solution of a Richman game by
reducing it to an SSG is existential in nature and does not give insight on the bids a player uses in
his winning strategy. We will return to this point later on.
Objectives We study zero-sum games. The qualitative games we focus on are parity games. A
parity game is a triple 〈V,E, p〉, where p : V → {0, . . . , d} is a parity function that assigns to each
vertex a parity index. An infinite outcome is winning for Player 1 iff the maximal index that is visited
infinitely often is odd. The quantitative games we focus on are mean-payoff games. A mean-payoff
game is 〈V,E,w〉, where w : V → Z is a weight function on the vertices. We often refer to the
sum of weights in a path as its energy. Consider an infinite outcome pi = v0, 〈v1, b1, i1〉, . . .. For
n ≥ 0, we use pin to refer to the prefix of length n of pi. The energy of pin, denoted E(pin), is∑
0≤i≤n−1 w(vi). We define the mean-payoff value of pi to be lim infn→∞
E(pin)
n . The value of pi
can be thought of as the amount of money Player 1 pays Player 2. Note that the mean-payoff values
do not affect the budgets of the players. That is, the game has two currencies: a “monopoly money”
that is used to determine who moves the token and which the players do not care about once the
game ends, and the mean-payoff value that is determined according to the weights of the vertices,
which is the value that Min and Max seek to minimize and maximize, respectively. Consider a finite
outcome pi. We use Bm(pi) and BM (pi) to denote the sum of payments of Min and Max in the bids.
Throughout the paper we use m and M to refer to Min and Max, respectively.
Strategy complexity Recall that a winning strategy in a two-player game often corresponds to a
system implementation. Thus, we often search for strategies that use limited or no memory. That is,
we ask whether a player can win even with a memoryless strategy, which is a strategy in which the
action depends only on the position of the game and not on the history. For example, in turn-based
games, for i ∈ {1, 2}, a memoryless strategy for Player i prescribes, for each vertex v ∈ Vi, a
successor vertex u. It is well known that memoryless strategies are sufficient for winning in a wide
variety of games, including turn-based parity games and turn-based mean-payoff games. In Richman
games, the threshold budgets tell us who the winner of the game is. But, they do not give insight
on how the game is won game, namely what are the bids the winning player bids in order to win.
Particularly, when the threshold budgets are 0 as we shall see in Lemmas 7 and 12.
We extend the definition of memoryless strategies to bidding games, though the right definition
is not immediate. One can define a memoryless strategy as a function from vertex and budget to
action (i.e., bid and vertex) similar to the definition in other games. However, this definition does
not preserve the philosophy of implementation with no additional memory. Indeed, recall the proof
of Theorem 3. One can define a strategy that, given a vertex v ∈ V and a budget B, bids according
to Rt(v), where t is the minimal index such that Rt(v) < B. Clearly, the memory that is needed to
implement such a strategy is infinite.
To overcome this issue, we use a different definition. We define a memoryless strategy in a vertex
v ∈ V with initial budget B ∈ [0, 1] as a pair 〈u, fBv 〉, where u ∈ adj(v) is the vertex to proceed to
upon winning and fBv : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a function that takes the current budget and, in mean-payoff
games, also the energy, and returns a bid. We require that fBv is simple, namely a polynomial or
a selection between a constant number of polynomials. For simplicity, we assume a memoryless
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strategy is generated for an initial vertex with an initial budget, thus there can be different strategies
depending where the game starts and with what budget. Also, we call a concatenation of memoryless
strategies, a memoryless strategy.
3 Parity Bidding Games
We study threshold budgets in bidding parity games. We first study strongly-connected parity games
and show a classification for them; either Player 1 wins with every initial budget or Player 2 wins
with every initial budget.
I Lemma 7. Consider a strongly-connected parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. There exists τ ∈ {0, 1}
such that for every v ∈ V , we have R(v) = τ . Moreover, we have τ = 0 iff maxv∈V p(v) is odd.
Proof. The proof relies on the following claim: Player 1 wins a Richman game in which only
his target is reachable, with every initial budget. The claim clearly implies the lemma as we view a
strongly-connected bidding parity game as a Richman game in which Player 1 tries to force the game
to the vertex with the highest parity index, and Player 2 has no target, thus Player 1 wins with every
initial budget. The claim is similar for Player 2. The proof of the claim follows from the fact that
the threshold budget of a vertex v ∈ V is some average between THRESH(vR) and THRESH(vS),
and the average depends on the distances of v to the two targets. When only Player 1’s target is
reachable, we have THRESH(v) = 0. The details of the proof can be found in the full version. J
Consider a bidding parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. Let R and S be the set of vertices in the BSCCs
that are winning for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Let G′ be the Richman game that is obtained
from G by setting the target of Player 1 to be the vertices in R and the target of Player 2 to be the
vertices in S. The following lemma follows from Lemma 7.
I Lemma 8. For every v ∈ V , we have that THRESH(v) in G equals THRESH(v) in G′.
Lemma 8 allows us to obtain the positive results of Richman games in parity bidding games. In
the full version, we construct memoryless strategies in Richman games. The idea is to show that a
bid at a vertex v of the form R(v
+)−R(v−)
2 +  guarantees that either vR is reached within |V | steps,
or Player 1’s budget increases by a constant. Thus, we have the following.
I Theorem 9. The threshold budgets in parity bidding games exist, are unique, THRESH-BUDG
is in NP ∩ coNP, and memoryless strategies suffice for winning.
4 Mean-Payoff Bidding Games
We proceed to study mean-payoff games. We adjust the definition of threshold budgets to the quant-
itative setting.
I Definition 10. Consider a mean-payoff bidding game G = 〈V,E,w〉. The threshold budget in a
vertex v ∈ V , denoted THRESH(v), is a value t ∈ [0, 1] such that
1. If Min’s budget exceeds t at v, then he can guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff value, and
2. if Max’s budget exceeds 1− t, then he can guarantee a strictly positive value.
4.1 Solving Bidding Mean-Payoff Games
In this section we solve the problem of finding threshold values in bidding mean-payoff games.
Our solution relies on work on probabilistic models, namely one-counter simple stochastic games
[14, 13], and it is existential in nature. Namely, knowing what the threshold budget is in v does not
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give much insight on how Min guarantees a non-negative value even if he has sufficient budget, and
similarly for Max. Constructing concrete memoryless strategies for the two players is much more
challenging and we show constructions in the following sections.
Recall that in bidding parity games, we showed a classification for strongly-connected games;
namely, the threshold budgets in all vertices are in {0, 1}, thus either Player 1 wins with every initial
budget or Player 2 wins with every initial budget. We show a similar classification for strongly-
connected bidding mean-payoff games: the threshold budgets in all vertices of a strongly-connected
bidding mean-payoff game are in {0, 1}, thus in a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game,
for every initial energy and every initial budget, either Min can guarantee a non-positive mean-payoff
value or Max can guarantee a positive mean-payoff value. The classification uses a generalization
of the Richman function to weighted graphs. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff
game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex u ∈ V . We construct a graph Gu = 〈V u, Eu, wu〉 by making two
copies us and ut of u, where us has no incoming edges and ut has no outgoing edges. Thus, a path
from us to ut in Gu corresponds to a loop in G. Recall that we denote by w(v) the weight of the
vertex v.
I Definition 11. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉, a
vertex u ∈ V . We define the weighted Richman function W : V → Q first on Gu. We define
W (ut) = 0 and for every v ∈ (S \ {ut}), we define W (v) = 12
(
W (v+) +W (v−)
)
+ w(v). In
order to define W on G, we define W (u) to be W (us) in Gu.
We use the connection with probabilistic models as in Observation 5 in order to show that W is well
defined. We view Gu as a rewarded Markov chain, in which, for v ∈ V , the outgoing edges from
v with positive probability probabilities are 〈v, v+〉 and 〈v, v−〉, and their probability is 1/2. The
function W coincides with the expected reward of a run that starts and returns to u, which in turn is
well-defined since the probability of returning to u is 1.
Similarly to the connection we show in Theorem 6 between Richman values and reachability
probabilities in a simple-stochastic game, we prove Lemma 12 by connecting the threshold value
in bidding mean-payoff games to the probability that a counter in a one-counter simple-stochastic
games reaches value 0. We then use results from [14, 13] on this model to prove the lemma. The
proof can be found in the full version.
I Lemma 12. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. There is
τ ∈ {0, 1} such that for every v ∈ V , we have THRESH(v) = τ . Moreover, we have τ = 0 iff there
exists u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0.
Lemma 13, which is also helpful in the following sections, shows how to connect the mean-
payoff value with the objective of reaching energy 0 or maintaining non-negative energy. Its proof
can be found in the full version.
I Lemma 13. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game G and a vertex u in G.
Suppose that for every initial budget and initial energy, Min has a strategy fm and there is a
constant N ∈ N such that for every Max strategy fM , a finite outcome pi = out(u, fm, fM )
either reaches energy 0 or the energy is bounded by N throughout pi. Then, Min can guarantee
a non-positive mean-payoff value in G.
If for every initial budget BinitM ∈ [0, 1] for Max there exists an initial energy level n ∈ N such
that Max can guarantee a non-negative energy level in G, then Max can guarantee a positive
mean-payoff value in G.
The proof of the following theorem can be found in the full version. Deciding the classifica-
tion in Lemma 12 can be done in NP and coNP by guessing the neighbors the vertices and using
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linear programming, similarly to Richman games. Then, we reduce bidding mean-payoff games to
Richman games in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 8 for parity games.
I Theorem 14. Threshold budgets exist in bidding mean-payoff games, they are unique, and
THRESH-BUDG for bidding mean-payoff games is in NP ∩ coNP.
4.2 A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Min
We turn to the more challenging task of finding memoryless strategies for the players, and in this
section we focus on constructing a strategy for Min. Theorem 9 and Lemma 12 allow us to focus
on strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff games. Consider a strongly-connected bidding mean-
payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 that has a vertex u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0. We construct a Min memory-
less strategy that guarantees that for every initial energy and every initial budget, either the energy
level reaches 0 or it is bounded. By Lemma 13, this suffices for Min to guarantee a non-positive
mean-payoff value in G.
The idea behind our construction is to tie between changes in the energy level and changes of the
budget. That is, in order to decrease the energy by one unit, Min needs to invest at most one unit of
budget (with an appropriate normalization), and when Max increases the energy by one unit, Min’s
gain is at least one unit of budget. Our solution builds on an alternative solution to the two-loop
game in Figure 1. This solution is inspired by a similar solution in [35].
I Example 15. Consider the bidding mean-payoff game that is depicted in Figure 1. We show a
Min strategy that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value. Consider an initial Min budget of
Binitm ∈ [0, 1] and an initial energy level of kI ∈ N. Let N ∈ N be such that Binitm > kN . Min bids
1
N and takes the (−1)-weighted edge upon winning. Intuitively, Min invests 1N for every decrease
of unit of energy and, since by losing a bidding he gains at least 1N , this is also the amount he gains
when the energy increases. Formally, it is not hard to show that the following invariant is maintained:
if the energy level reaches k ∈ N, Min’s budget is at least kN . Note that the invariant implies that
either an energy level of 0 is reached infinitely often, or the energy is bounded byN . Indeed, in order
to cross an energy of N , Max would need to invest a budget of more than 1. Lemma 13 implies that
the mean-payoff value is non-positive, and we are done. J
Extending this result to general strongly connected games is not immediate. Consider a strongly-
connected game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex u ∈ V . We would like to maintain the invariant that
upon reaching uwith energy k, the budget of Min exceeds k/N , for a carefully chosenN . The game
in the simple example above has two favorable properties that general SCCs do not necessarily have.
First, unlike the game in the example, there can be infinite paths that avoid u, thus Min might need
to invest budget in drawing the game back to u. Moreover, different paths from u to itself may have
different energy levels, so bidding a uniform value (like the 1N above) is not possible. The solution
to these problems is surprisingly elegant and uses the weighted Richman function in Definition 11.
Consider an initial budget of Binitm ∈ [0, 1] for Min and an initial energy kI ∈ N. We describe
Min’s strategy fm. At a vertex v ∈ V , Min’s bid is W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 · 1N and he proceeds to v− upon
winning, where we choose N ∈ N in the following. Let wM be the maximal absolute weighted
Richman value in G, thus wM = maxv∈V |W (v)|. Let bM be the maximal absolute “bid”, thus
bM = maxv∈V |W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 |. We choose N ∈ N such that Binitm > kI+bM+wMN .
In the following lemmas we prove that fm guarantees that an outcome either reaches energy
level 0 or that the energy is bounded, as well as showing that fm is legal, i.e., that Min always bids
less than his budget. The following lemma is the crux of the construction as it connects the weighted
Richman function with the change in energy and in budget. Recall that for a finite outcome pi the
accumulated energy in pi is E(pi) and the payments of Min throughout pi is Bm(pi).
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I Lemma 16. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome that
starts in a vertex v and ends in v′. Then, we have W (v)−W (v′) ≥ E(pi) +N · Bm(pi).
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of pi. In the base case v = v′, thus E(pi) = Bm(pi) = 0
and the claim is trivial. For the induction step, let b be the winning bid in the first round and
let pi′ be the suffix of pi after the first bidding. We distinguish between two cases. In the first
case, Min wins the bidding, pays b = W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 · 1N , and proceeds to v−. Thus, we have
E(pi) + N · Bm(pi) = w(v) + E(pi′) + N
(
b + Bm(pi′)
)
. By the induction hypothesis, we have
E(pi′) + N · Bm(pi′) ≤ W (v−) −W (v′), thus E(pi) + N · Bm(pi) ≤ w(v) + W (v
+)−W (v−)
2 +
W (v−) −W (v′) = W (v) −W (v′), and we are done. For the second case, suppose Max wins the
bidding. Min’s gain is−b < −W (v+)−W (v−)2 · 1N , and Max proceeds to v′′ havingW (v′′) ≤W (v+).
Similar to the previous case, we have E(pi) +N · Bm(pi) = w(v) +E(pi′) +N
(− b+Bm(pi′)) ≤
w(v)− W (v−)−W (v+)2 +W (v+)−W (v′) =W (v)−W (v′), and we are done. J
The following corollary of Lemma 16 explains why we refer to our technique as “tying energy
and budget”. Its proof follows from the fact that W (us) ≤ 0 and W (ut) = 0.
I Corollary 17. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome from
u to u. Then, we have −N · Bm(pi) ≤ E(pi).
We formalize the intuition above by means of an invariant that is maintained throughout the
outcome. Recall that the game starts from a vertex u ∈ V with W (u) ≤ 0, the initial energy is
kI ∈ N, Min’s initial budget is Binitm ∈ [0, 1], and N is such that Binitm > kI+bM+wMN .
I Lemma 18. Consider a Max strategy fM , and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome. Then,
when the energy level reaches k, Min’s budget is at least k+bMN .
Proof. The invariant clearly holds initially. Consider a partition pi = pi1 ·pi2, where pi1 is a maximal
prefix of pi that ends in u and pi2 starts in u and ends in a vertex v ∈ V . The energy level at the end
of pi is k = kI +E(pi). Recall that Bm(pi) is the sum of Min’s payments in pi, thus his budget at the
end of pi is Binitm −
(Bm(pi1) + Bm(pi2)). By Corollary 17, we have −Bm(pi1) ≥ 1NE(pi1) and by
Lemma 16, we have−Bm(pi2) ≥ 1N
(
E(pi2)−W (u)+W (v)
) ≥ 1N (E(pi2)−0−wM). Combining
withBinitm ≥ kI+bM+wMN , we have that the new budget is at least kI+bM+wMN +E(pi1)N +E(pi2)−wMN =
k+bM
N , and we are done. J
Lemma 18 implies that Min always has sufficient budget to bid according to fm, thus the strategy is
legal. Moreover, since Min’s budget cannot exceed 1, Lemma 18 implies that if the energy does not
reach 0, then it is bounded byN−bM . Thus, Lemma 13 implies that Min has a memoryless strategy
that guarantees a non-positive mean-payoff value in a strongly-connected bidding mean-payoff game
having a vertex u with W (u) ≤ 0. Combining with the memoryless strategy in parity games, we
have the following.
I Theorem 19. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a vertex v ∈ V .
If Min’s initial budget exceeds THRESH(v), he has a memoryless strategy that guarantees a non-
positive mean-payoff value.
4.3 A Memoryless Optimal Strategy for Max
The complementary result of the previous section is more involved. Consider a strongly-connected
bidding mean-payoff game G with a vertex u that has W (u) > 0. We devise a Max strategy that
guarantees a positive mean-payoff value in G. We start with a fragment of the general case called
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recurrent SCCs, and we generalize our solution later. We say that an SCC G = 〈V,E〉 is a recurrent,
if there is a vertex u ∈ V such that every cycle in G includes u. We refer to u as the root of G.
Intuitively, the construction has two ingredients. First, we develop the idea of tying energy and
budget. We construct a Max strategy fM that guarantees the following: when Max invests a unit
of budget (with an appropriate normalization), then the energy increases by at least one unit, and
when the energy decreases by one unit, Max’s gain is at least z > 1 units of budget, where z arises
from the game graph. The second ingredient concerns the normalization factor. Recall that in the
previous section it was a constant 1N . Here on the other hand, it cannot be constant. Indeed, if
the normalization does not decrease as the energy increases, Max’s budget will eventually run out,
which is problematic since with a budget of 1, Min can guarantee reaching energy level 0, no matter
how high the energy is. The challenge is to decide when and how to decrease the normalization
factor. We split N into energy blocks of size M , for a carefully chosen M ∈ N. The normalization
factor of the bids depends on the block in which the energy is in, and we refer to it as the currency
of the block. The currency of the n-th block is z−n. Note that the currency of the (n−1)-th block is
higher by a factor of z from the currency of the n-th block. This is where the first ingredient comes
in: investing in the n-th block is done in the currency of the n-th block, whereas gaining in the n-th
block is in the higher currency of the (n− 1)-th block. We switch between the currencies when the
energy moves between energy blocks only at the root u of G. This is possible since G is a recurrent
SCC. The mismatch between gaining and investing is handy when switching between currencies as
we cannot guarantee that when we reach u the energy is exactly in the boundary of an energy block.
We formalize this intuition. We start by finding an alternative definition for the weighted Rich-
man function. Recall that in order to define W , we constructed a new graph Gu by splitting u into
us and ut. We define the contribution of a vertex v ∈ V to W (us), denoted cont(v), as follows. We
have cont(us) = 1. For a vertex v ∈ V , we define pre(v) = {v′ ∈ V : v = v′− or v = v′+}. For
v ∈ V , we define cont(v) = ∑v′∈pre(v) 12 · cont(v′). The proof of the following lemma uses the
connection with probabilistic models, and follows from standard arguments there.
I Lemma 20. We have W (u) =
∑
v∈V
(
cont(v) · w(v)).
Let z =
(∑
v:w(v)≥0 cont(v) · w(v)
) · (∑v:w(v)<0 cont(v) · |w(v)|)−1. Since W (u) > 0,
we have z > 1. Let Gz be the game that is obtained from G by multiplying the negative-weighted
vertices by z, thus Gz = 〈V,E,wz〉, where wz(v) = w(v) if w(v) ≥ 0 and otherwise wz(v) =
z · w(v). We denote by W z the weighted threshold budgets in Gz . The following lemma follows
immediately from Lemma 20.
I Lemma 21. We have W z(u) = 0.
We define the partition into energy blocks. Let cycles(u) be the set of simple cycles from u to
itself and wM = maxpi∈cycles(u) |E(pi)|. We choose M such that M ≥ (bM + 3wM )/(1 − z−1),
where bM is the maximal bid as in the previous section. We partition N into blocks of size M . For
n ≥ 1, we refer to the n-th block asMn, and we haveMn = {M(n−1),M(n−1)+1, . . . ,Mn−1}.
We use β↓n and β
↑
n to mark the upper and lower boundaries of Mn, respectively. We use a M≥n to
denote the set {Mn,Mn+1, . . .}. Consider a finite outcome pi that ends in u and let visitu(pi) be
the set of indices in which pi visits u. Let kI ∈ N be an initial energy. We say that pi visits Mn
if kI + E(pi) ∈ Mn. We say that pi stays in Mn starting from an index 1 ≤ i ≤ |pi| if for all
j ∈ visitu(pi) such that j ≥ i, we have kI + E(pi1, . . . , pij) ∈Mn.
We are ready to describe Max’s strategy fM . Suppose the game reaches a vertex v and the
energy in the last visit to u was in Mn, for n ≥ 1. Then, Max bids z−n · 12
(
W z(v+) −W z(v−))
and proceeds to v+ upon winning. Note that currency changes occur only in u. Recall that for an
outcome pi, the sum of payments of Max is BM (pi) and let Ez(pi) be the change in energy in Gz .
The proof of Lemma 16 can easily be adjusted to this setting.
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I Lemma 22. Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome that
starts in v, ends in v′, and stays within a block Mn, for n ≥ 1. We have W z(v) − W z(v′) ≤
Ez(pi)− zn · BM (pi). In particular, for pi ∈ cycles(u), we have Ez(pi) ≤ zn · BM (pi).
We relate between the changes in energy in the two structures. The proof of the following lemma
can be found in the full version.
I Lemma 23. Consider an outcome pi ∈ cycles(u). Then, E(pi) ≥ Ez(pi) and E(pi) ≥ zEz(pi).
A corollary of Lemmas 22 and 23 is the following. Recall that BM (pi) is the amount that Max pays,
thus it is negative when Max gains budget. Intuitively, the corollary states that if the energy increases
in Mn, then Max invests in the currency of Mn, and if the energy decreases, he gains in the currency
of Mn−1.
I Corollary 24. Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome such
that pi ∈ cycles(u). Then, we have E(pi) ≥ zn · BM (pi) and zE(pi) ≥ zn · BM (pi).
Consider an initial Max budget BinitM ∈ [0, 1]. We choose an initial energy kI ∈ N with which
fM guarantees that energy level 0 is never reached. Recall the intuition that increasing the energy by
a unit requires an investment of a unit of budget in the right currency. Thus, increasing the energy
from the lower boundary β↓n of Mn to its upper boundary β
↑
n, costs M · z−n. We use cost(Mn) to
refer to M · z−n and cost(M≥n) =
∑∞
i=n cost(Mn). A first guess for kI would be β↓n such that
BinitM > cost(M≥n). This is almost correct. We need some wiggle room to allow for changes in
the currency. Let wiggle = 2wM + bM , where recall that wM = maxpi∈cycles(u)E(pi) and that bM
is the maximal bid. We define kI to be β↓n such that B
init
M > wiggle · z−(n−1) + cost(M≥n) and∑n
i=1 cost(Mi) > 1, thus Min cannot decrease the energy to 0.
Consider a Min strategy fm, and let pi = out(fm, fM ) be a finite outcome. We partition pi into
subsequences in which the same currency is used. Let pi = pi1 · pi2 · . . . · pi` be a partition of pi. For
1 ≤ i ≤ `, we use pii to refer to the prefix pi1 · . . . · pii of pi, and we use ei = kI + E(pii) to refer to
the energy at the end of pii. Consider the partition in which, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `, the prefix pii visits u and
pii is a maximal subsequence that stays in some energy block.
Suppose pii stays in Mn. There can be two options; either the energy decreases in pii, thus the
energy before it ei−1 is inMn+1 and the energy after it ei is inMn, or it increases, thus ei−1 ∈Mn−1
and ei ∈ Mn. We then call pii decreasing and increasing, respectively. The definition of wM and
the fact that G is recurrent imply that upon entering Mn, the energy is within wM of the boundary.
Thus, in the case that pii is decreasing, the energy at the end of pii is ei ≥ β↑n − wM and in the case
it is increasing, we have ei ≤ β↓n + wM . Let `0 = 0, and for i ≥ 1, let `i = (β↓n+1 − wM ) − ei in
the first case and `i = (β↓n +wM )− ei in the second case. Note that `i ∈ {0, . . . , 2wM}. In the full
version, we prove the following invariant on Max’s budget when changing between energy blocks.
I Lemma 25. For every i ≥ 0, suppose pii ends in Mn. Then, Max’s budget is at least (wiggle+
`i) · z−(nˆ−1) + cost(M≥nˆ), where nˆ = n+ 1 if pii is decreasing and nˆ = n if pii is increasing.
It is not hard to show that Lemma 25 implies that fM is legal. That is, consider a finite outcome
pi that starts immediately after a change in currency. Using Lemma 22, we can prove by induction on
the length of pi that Max has sufficient budget for bidding. The harder case is when pi decreases, and
the proof follows from the fact that wiggle is in the higher currency of the lower block. Combining
Lemma 25 with our choice of the initial energy, we get that the energy never reaches 0 as otherwise
Min invests a budget of more than 1. Lemma 13 implies that Max guarantees a positive mean-payoff
value in a strongly-connected game.
I Theorem 26. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 in which all BSCCs are
recurrent. For a vertex v ∈ V , if Max has an initial budget that is greater than 1− THRESH(v), he
has a memoryless strategy that guarantees a positive mean-payoff value.
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General strongly-connected games In the full version, we develop a constant-memory strategy
for Max that guarantees a positive mean-payoff value. The difficulty lies in coping with outcomes
in which the energy forms a sine-like wave on the boundary of an energy block. In recurrent SCCs,
we can change currency every time the wave changes block, which does not work in general SCCs
as we show in an example. We develop further the two ingredients that are used in fM . First, recall
that investing in an energy block Mn is in the currency of the n-th block, whereas gaining is in the
higher currency of the (n − 1)-th block. In general games, we need a stronger property; investing
in Mn is in the lower currency of the (n + 1)-th block while gaining is still in the higher currency
of the (n− 1)-th block. Next, we differentiate between even blocks, i.e., M2n, and odd blocks, i.e.,
M2n+1, for some n ∈ N. When the energy level reaches an even block M2n, the currency used
is z−n. In order to determine the currency in the odd blocks, we take the history of the play into
account; the currency matches the currency in the last energy block that was visited before entering
M2n+1. Hence, we call our strategy a constant-memory strategy. The odd blocks serve as “buffers”
so that when we change currency, there is a sufficiently large change in energy that in turn implies
that Max’s budget sufficiently increases compared with the change in energy. Combining with the
memoryless strategy in parity games of Theorem 9, we have the following.
I Theorem 27. Consider a bidding mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. For a vertex v ∈ V , if Max
has an initial budget that is greater than 1 − THRESH(v), he has a constant-memoryless strategy
that guarantees a positive mean-payoff value.
5 Discussion and Future Directions
We introduce and study infinite-duration bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move
the token. This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas
of formal methods and algorithmic game theory (AGT, for short). Richman games originated in the
game theory community in the 90s and recently gained interest by the AGT community [30]. We
combine them with the study of infinite-duration games, which is well-studied in the formal methods
community. Prior to this work, a series of works focused on applying concepts and ideas from
formal methods to resource-allocation games [10, 8, 9, 6, 7, 34], which constitutes a well-studied
class of games in AGT. More to the formal methods side, there are many works on games that share
similar concepts to these that are studied in AGT. For example, logics for reasoning about multi-
agent systems [3, 19, 39], studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems
[18, 25, 1, 15], and studies of infinite-duration non-zero-sum games [21, 16, 17, 12].
There are several problems we left open as well as plenty of future research directions. We list
a handful of them below. We showed that the complexity of THRESH-BUDG is in NP and coNP.
We leave open the problem of determining its exact complexity. We conjecture that it is reducible
from solving simple stochastic games, which will show that it is as hard as several other problems
whose exact complexity is unknown. In this work we focused on parity and mean-payoff games.
Energy games are games that are played on a weighted graph, where one of the players tries to reach
negative energy and the second player tries to prevent it. Note that unlike parity and mean-payoff,
the energy objective is not prefix independent. We can show that threshold budgets exist in energy
games. The complexity of THRESH-BUDG in energy games is interesting and is tied with recent
work on optimizing the probability of reaching a destination in a weighted MDP [26, 41]. For acyclic
energy bidding games, the problem is PP-hard using a result in [26], and for a single-vertex games
the problem is in P using the direct formula of [32]. For general games the problem is open.
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